Este artículo revisa la situación de la teoría filosófica del conocimiento en la segunda mitad del siglo XX y el aporte de L. Polo a la misma. Se considera la importancia del aporte de L. Polo al realismo gnoseológico que se ha ido abriendo paso en esta época postmoderna, después de los excesos del criticismo inmanentista moderno. Se destacan dos aspectos relevantes de la teoría del conocimiento de L. Polo: a) su propuesta de una versión realista, no husserliana-cartesiana, de la (...) intencionalidad cognitiva como intencionalidad del objeto respecto a la realidad objetivada y no como relación del acto al objeto, y b) su aporte a la superación del criticismo inmenentista moderno mediante la identificación y revisión de sus orígenes tardomedievales en el representacionismo semántico de Ockham y en el representacionismo especulativo de Duns Escoto. (shrink)

In this work we develop a discussion that seeks to clarify and substantiate the thesis that the late medieval voluntarism, mainly that of Duns Scotus, is a factor whose consideration is essential to understand the origin of modern thought and its drift in a culture of freedom and innovation as ends in themselves. By voluntarism we understand the conception of the divine and also human will as a power that determines itself in its act and that, in this particular sense, (...) is absolutely free, since it does not recognize any other influence beyond itself. Both the act of will and its effect are then understood as an entirely new and original product. We carry out a critical analysis of this voluntarism based on the texts of Scotus and other medieval authors, and a historical-philosophical analysis of its possible influence on the evolution of modern philosophy. (shrink)

Se busca mostrar la fuerte herencia voluntarista tardo-medieval de origen escotista en la filosofía política moderna, sobre todo en Bodino, Maquiavelo y Hobbes, pero también en Locke, Rousseau y Kant. Se examina la concepción escotista del poder y su fundamentación filosófico-teológica, así como algunos tópicos de su “nueva” metafísica y antropología para desglosar sus consecuencias directas o indirectas en la filosofía política moderna.

Resumen: El presente artículo trata de mostrar y demostrar la influencia del voluntarismo tardo-medieval -tanto en su versión escotista como principalmente en la ockhamista- en la filosofía política y jurídica moderna. Parte exponiendo en forma sintética los principios fundamentales de la filosofía de Ockham para luego analizar algunas de sus consecuencias, entre las que destacan el contingentismo de la ley y el individualismo metodológico.: The present article tries to show and to demonstrate the influence of the late-medieval voluntarism -both in (...) its escotic version and mainly in the ockhamist- in the modern political and juridical philosophy. Part exposing in synthetic form the fundamental principles of Ockham's philosophy to later analyze some of its consequences, among which the contingentism of law and methodological individualism stand out. (shrink)

The origin of Modernity is a problem often neglected in current debate, and several landmarks are often suggested, such as the new science, the Renaissance, Descartes philosophical approach or the Illustration. In this paper it is suggested that the roots of Modernity could pre-date those conventional landmarks, and could be found in the great political and cultural conflicts that occurred in Europe in the Low Middle Age.

In this article we propose to analyze the influence of Ockham on the modern philosophy of law by introducing the division between “subjective right” and “objective right”, the voluntarist conception of ownership and property, and the forgetting of distributive justice in favor of the struggle between commutative justice (subjectiveright) and legal justice (objective right).

In this paper I am trying to show the differential points of view between the escotistic theory of knowledge -which is a peculiar derivation of agustinism- and the axiomatic gnoseolog of L. Polo, which has his inspiration in Aristotle. The univocist conceptualism together with the intuicionism of Duns Scotus leads to a primacy of the mental presency, wich is just what Polo tries to overcome.

Me propongo analizar, replantear y mostrar la coherencia de ciertas propuestas prácticas de algunos filósofos y psicólogos humanistas contemporáneos sobre la educación. Concretamente, me referiré a la filosofía humanista de Jacques Maritain, y a la psicología humanista de Karl Rogers y Abraham Maslow. Si bien estas propuestas provienen de enfoques distintos y con una fundamentación algo diversa, todas coinciden en su carácter humanista y en su preocupación por la educación integral de la persona humana en su ser individual y social. (...) Trataré de mostrar cómo algunas de sus propuestas prácticas pueden ser inspiradoras de nuevas posibilidades y enfoques para la educación en el siglo XXI, especialmente en relación con los aspectos motivacionales y actitudinales del proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje. (shrink)

Más que amor a la verdad, en este trabajo se estudia la concepción escotista de la verdad. Para Escoto, el objeto pensado es real, causa en la facultad el acto de conocer; por tanto, es previo al acto. La verdad consiste en la semejanza del acto intelectivo con tal objeto: objetivismo. En ello se separa del pensamiento medieval precedente (el objeto no es real, sino intencional), es decir, lo semejante a la realidad es el objeto, no el acto. A su (...) vez, esta tesis es antecedente de la gnoseología posterior. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants provide a range of services in hospital settings and in teaching environments. Training to achieve the skills needed to meet the expectations of employers comes in various forms, ranging from on-the-job training to formal fellowship training programs. We surveyed graduates of clinical ethics fellowships to evaluate their self-reported preparedness for their first job after fellowship training. The results indicated several areas of need, including greater exposure to program-building skills, quality improvement skills, and approaches to working with members (...) of higher administration. These data will be of use to educators as well as to fellows who advocate for elements of training in preparation for their first position. (shrink)

Semi-intuitionistic logic is the logic counterpart to semi-Heyting algebras, which were defined by H. P. Sankappanavar as a generalization of Heyting algebras. We present a new, more streamlined set of axioms for semi-intuitionistic logic, which we prove translationally equivalent to the original one. We then study some formulas that define a semi-Heyting implication, and specialize this study to the case in which the formulas use only the lattice operators and the intuitionistic implication. We prove then that all the logics thus (...) obtained are equivalent to intuitionistic logic, and give their Kripke semantics. (shrink)

I argue that there are different orders of mechanisms with different constitutive relevance and individuation conditions. In common first-order mechanistic explanations, constitutive relevance norms are captured by the matched-interlevel-experiments condition (Craver et al. (2021) Synthese 199:8807–8828). Regarding individuation, we say that any two mechanisms are of the same type when they have the same concrete components performing the same activities in the same arrangement. By contrast, in higher-order mechanistic explanations, we formulate the decompositions in terms of generalized basic components (GBCs). (...) These GBCs (e.g., logic gates) possess causal properties that are common to a set of physical systems. Mechanistic explanations formulated in terms of GBCs embody the epistemic value of horizontal integration, which aims to explain as many phenomena as possible with a minimal amount of abstract components (Wajnerman Paz (2017a) Philos Psychol 30:213–234). Two higher-order mechanisms are of the same type when they share all the same GBCs, and they are organized as performing the same activities with the same interactions. I use this notion of mechanistic order to enhance the mechanistic account of computation (MAC) and provide an account of the epistemic norms of computational explanation and the nature of medium-independent functional properties and mechanisms. Finally, I use these new conceptual tools to address four criticisms of the MAC. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone argumentar que el proyecto sociopolítico enunciado por Alberdi en Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina contribuyó a imposibilitar la constitución del moderno estado nacional cuya existencia buscó promover. El logro de dicho objetivo sólo resultará posible a partir de explicitar los supuestos alrededor de los que se estructura el razonamiento que permite alcanzar dicha conclusión; hacerlo implicará, en primer lugar, señalar las reflexiones de Aníbal Quijano en torno a (...) la constitución de los modernos estados nacionales y al eurocentrismo, en segundo lugar, establecer el carácter eurocéntrico de Las Bases y, por último, reconstruir el razonamiento que sustenta la idea directriz que atraviesa al trabajo. This paper intends to argue that the sociopolitical project enunciated by Alberdi on Bases and starting points for the political organization of Argentina contributed to preclude the constitution of the modern national state of which existence it sought to promote. Achieving this goal will only be possible by making explicit the assumptions from which the reasoning that allows to reach such conclusion are structured; it will involve, first, to point out Quijano's reflections about the constitution of modern national states and the eurocentrism, secondly, to establish The Bases's eurocentric nature and, finally, to rebuild the reasoning behind the leading idea running through the work. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se arriesga una nueva interpretación del concepto kantiano de autonomía, abordándolo desde una perspectiva “heterónoma”. En efecto, sin soslayar la interpretación ya clásica de aquél se indaga sobre la posibilidad de pensarlo como tributario de una heteronomía que señala de alguna manera a la autonomía una dignidad sobre la cual ésta no puede tener prácticamente ninguna injerencia. Se pone de relieve así pues el hecho de que esta dignidad inviolable marca una diferencia práctica más radical que (...) la identidad lógica sobre la que se basa la autonomía y sobre la que descansa la ontología en cuanto tal. (shrink)

RESUMEN La filosofia de Sócrates posee un carácter muy peculiar debido a la ausencia de doctrinas bien establecidas y a la inseparable vinculación entre vida y pensamiento. Por este motivo, el filosofar socrático debe entenderse unido a sus andanzas callejeras y a la revisión constante de cualquier planteamiento. Partiendo de esta hipótesis, el artículo pretende mostrar tanto la originalidad del pensamiento socrático y su concepción de la filosofía como la enorme influencia que ejerce en los textos de Platón, que emplean (...) de manera sutil esos extravíos y divagaciones con el propósito de enriquecer la conversación, de dotar de profundidad a las argumentaciones y de obligar al lector a recorrer ese mismo camino sinuoso que es el de la reflexión filosófica. Con ello, ambos pensadores muestran que la filosofía no es tanto un saber sino una actividad. ABSTRACT Socrates' philosophy has a very peculiar character due to the absence of well-established doctrines and the unbreakable bond between life and thought. For this reason, Socratic philosophy must be understood along with his street wanderings and the constant revision of any intellectual approach. Starting from this hypothesis, this paper aims to show both the originality of Socratic thought and his notion of philosophy, as well as the enormous influence he exerts on Plato, who subtly employs these wanderings and digressions in his texts to enrich the dialogue, providing depth to the arguments, and forcing the reader to travel that same winding road that is philosophical thought. Thus, both thinkers show that philosophy is not so much a kind of knowledge as it is an activity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gordon Kaufman InterviewGordon Kaufman, emeritus professor of theology at Harvard Divinity School, has been a member of the Cobb-Abe Buddhist-Christian dialogue since its inception in 1987. As he mentions below, that experience has profoundly affected his work as a theologian and his conviction that theology is an activity of “the imaginative construction of a comprehensive and coherent picture of humanity in the world under God.” This perspective has characterized (...) his work from Systematic Theology (1968) through his more recent In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology (1993). Rita Gross and Terry Muck, coeditors of Buddhist-Christian Studies, explored with Gordon the important role Buddhism has played in his theological construction.Buddhist-Christian Studies: Does religious pluralism present Christian theologians with a unique task?Gordon Kaufman: Yes. Through most of Christian history theologians have argued that God revealed Godself to the Christian church in a way unlike any other religious group. Christians had the truth about human beings, their nature, their deepest problems, and solutions to those problems. Now, especially since World War II, a much greater consciousness of the significance of other religious traditions has grown among Christians. The unique challenge to Christian theologians is: What do we as theologians say to believers about what to do with this old tradition of uniqueness and infallible truth?Are Buddhist ‘theologians’ faced with a similar challenge in their communities?Yes.Are there specific features of either Christian theology or Buddhist theology that make either one of these religions more able or less able to step up to the challenge? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these two religions when it comes to the issues religious pluralism raises?I don’t want to speak for the Buddhist tradition in this respect. But I will say that both traditions have adapted to many different cultures around the world and there is a kind of flexibility in these traditions that gives hope. Christian monotheism, for example, is sometimes seen as contributing to exclusivism. But monotheism can be seen as including the notion of one source and ordering principle working in all of life, and that means we are all equal within the world and all related within the world to each other. And that leads to a central teaching of the Christian message: what God requires of us is that we be reconciled with those brothers and sisters from whom we are alienated. The simple Christian demand that we love not only our [End Page 43] neighbors but also our enemies now becomes a very powerful mandate if connected up with that one high monotheistic principle.Is there a certain commensurability between the way Buddhist and Christian theologians do their work?Let’s start by defining the terms. I don’t use the phrase ‘Buddhist theology’ but ‘Buddhist reflective thinking.’ This is less loaded than ‘theology,’ the study of God, but I have no objection if others want to call it Buddhist theology. Now, regarding ‘commensurability.’ I don’t regard myself as a good enough scholar of the history of religion to use that phrase. I’m a little suspicious of it because I am deeply impressed with the difference in lifestyles and commitments and value orientations that different symbols in various religious traditions promote. Thus I don’t want to assume there is a basic commensurability. The basic requirement for the Christian theologian is that we be open to all human beings. Then we’ll see what commensurability there is.So it’s not so much a cognitive category as an attitude or an approach—a common, human desire?Not necessarily a common human desire. I suspect there are strong motivations in all human beings, at least in many, not to be ‘open’ to all other persons. Many simply identify with the groups they are in and are not concerned much about others. I do say that there is a strong Christian imperative to enter into loving relationship with strangers, and whether that is true or not on the other side is for me to find out.How important is it to find out?Very important. It may have been that in earlier times we could continue to live in... (shrink)

The author exposes the doctrine of "Deontologic Liberalism" which is described, mainly, by J. Rawls, specially about the "privatization" that he makes of the human good and the consequent founding of the moral duties in a "public agreement". Then, he compares that to the doctrine of Millán-Puelles about the comunity and the objectivity of the human good, as well as of the founding of Ethics in the human nature and, finally, in the transcendent Absolute.

This dialogue took place at the beginning of the process through which Lula became president of Brazil. It analyses the empowerment capacity of the Workers’ Party: it is made of collective discussion and free speech, working class embedding, openness to the whole society, welcome to minorities, respect and distance front other parties, sense of uniqueness. The French socialist party lacks those qualities, which one could, find also in Solidarnosc.

In the present paper it is shown, following Levinas, that Ethics, understood as an intersubjective relation among completely separate subjects, sets itself up starting from concrete events that determine man's historical existence, but these are invested with the peculiarity of being events which escape the ontological order. Rather, they send to somewhere beyond, outside ontology, signifying above all in an ethical fashion, i.e., in a way other than being.

La hermenéutica ha reivindicado un concepto especial de comprensión. El concepto de aplicación - apropiación es la cifra de ese especial modo de comprender. Si “comprender es aplicar” (Gadamer), es porque la aplicación es el remedio contra una extrañeza, una distancia, una lejanía que tiene aspectos gnoseológicos y existenciales. En este trabajo, rastreo y analizo las raíces del concepto hermenéutico de aplicación haciendo hincapié en su aspecto práctico existencial. Lo que nos enseña la categoría de aplicación es que el criterio (...) mismo de la comprensión, al menos para ciertas expresiones (y ciertos textos) es el efecto que causa en nuestra forma de ver el mundo (o una porción de él). Conceptos como “salvación” (raíz religiosa), “disposición afectiva y cognitiva” (raíz ética), “persuasión” (raíz retórica), y “catarsis” (raíz estética) dejan ver la necesidad del sujeto de apropiarse de un saber que modificará su modo de ver el mundo, su modo de estar en él. (shrink)

La inteligencia artificial transforma el derecho. No es solo un modo de facilitar la actividad jurídica. Tiene implicaciones epistemológicas y sociales. El derecho se reduce a datos y a cálculos. Prospera un jurista maquinal. Se empobrece la racionalidad jurídica. Se olvida que la clave del derecho no es el procesamiento de datos sino la creación de sentido.

El tema principal es sugerir la continuidad entre las diferentes maneras de entender la reducción fenomenológica en la fenomenología de Husserl. A fin de presentar esta posibilidad argumento a favor de la importancia de la intencionalidad de horizonte como guía del análisis trascendental que parte de la fenomenología del mundo de la vida. Es posible entender el análisis fenomenológico como un método explicitativo que descubre paso a paso las diferentes capas de sentido, tomando como guía la descripción de la estructura (...) del mundo como horizonte implícito de nuestras vivencias. (shrink)

Nietzsche utiliza gran parte de los argumentos empleados por él mismo contra la metafísica en general para criticar el cogito cartesiano. La afinidad señalada por el propio Descartes entre el cogito y la conciencia hace que el estudio se centre en el análisis nietzscheano del problema de la conciencia, prestando especial atención a sus implicaciones antropológicas. Frente al raciocentrismo cartesiano, Nietzsche sostiene que, dado que la conciencia no es una entidad ajena al mundo natural, es posible presentar una antropología estrictamente (...) naturalista, que no necesita recurrir a hipótesis dualistas tribu-tarias de la metafísica o de la teología. (shrink)